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THE ELUSIVE RIGHT TO TRUTH IN TRANSITIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
JURISPRUDENCE 
 




This article undertakes a comparative legal analysis of the elusive ‘right to truth’ in 
international human rights jurisprudence, with a particular focus on the scope of an emerging 
legal duty to find the truth about historical human rights abuses after periods of political 
transition. Whilst the importance of knowing the truth about historical human rights abuses is 
recognised in policy and academic literature on 'transitional justice' there are distinct 
challenges to vindicating the right to truth in transitional human rights jurisprudence. These 
challenges arise from limits upon the temporal jurisdiction of international human rights 
courts. There is substantial inconsistency between human rights regimes on how they 
establish temporal jurisdiction in their transitional jurisprudence, which has not yet been 
systematically investigated. This contribution fills the gap in the literature by identifying and 
critiquing the way in which the right to truth in times of transition is both expressly and 
implicitly vindicated in the global jurisprudence of the ICCPR Human Rights Committee, and 
the regional jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and European Court 
of Human Rights (the conclusion also addresses the less voluminous African regional 
jurisprudence). The piece makes a contribution both to the vindication of victims’ and their 
next of kin’s rights to know about pre-transition human rights abuses, as well as to the 
developing literature on the ‘transitional jurisprudence’ of human rights enforcement bodies. 
It is argued that the 'underlying values' of human rights treaties can provide a foundation for a 




This article undertakes a comparative legal analysis of the ‘right to truth’ in international 
human rights jurisprudence, with a particular focus on the under-explored but crucial question 
of the scope of an emerging legal duty to find the truth about historical human rights abuses in 
periods of political transition.  
 
The search for the truth about the past is particularly significant in ‘transitional’ 
societies – those transitioning from conflict to peace, from totalitarianism to democracy. The 
UN Secretary General has stressed the importance of truth within the framework of 
transitional justice, 1  and the significance of ‘historical justice’ is well-recognised in the 
transitional justice literature. 2  Ruti Teitel, for example, observed that transitional history 
making is endowed with, ‘real transformative potential’.3 The Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights has stated that, ‘reaching at a complete, factual and impartial truth - 
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insights. Later versions of this piece benefited from discussions with Kieran McEvoy, Steven Wheatley, and 
Alice Panepinto. Many thanks also to the anonymous reviewers at ICLQ. 
1 Report of the Secretary General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Situations (2004) UN Doc S/2004/616, 4, 17. 
2 R Teitel, Transitional Justice (OUP 2000). 
3 Ibid, 71. 
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reconstructed, shared and legitimized by society - is a fundamental factor in restoring citizens’ 
confidence in the institutions of the State.’4 
 
Yet, although the importance of knowing the truth about human rights violations of 
the past is widely recognised, this can be distinguished from the emergence of a legal ‘right’ 
to truth per se.5 Indeed the first part of this article demonstrates that an international legal 
‘right to truth’ remains elusive. 6  In the narrower realm of international human rights 
jurisprudence, 7  however, there have been tangible developments. These developments 
intersect with emerging standards on countering impunity and the promotion of victims’ 
rights to a remedy for gross and systematic human rights violations – although it is readily 
conceded that truth-finding via criminal prosecution and public judicial record is far from the 
only means of achieving historical justice.8 We shall see that the right to truth in international 
human rights law is closely connected9 to the duties to investigate or to prosecute, identified 
for example in the pioneering work of Naomi Roht-Arriaza,10 Diane Orentlicher11 and Juan 
Méndez,12 (and later enshrined in the various soft-law instruments discussed below). However 
there are distinct challenges to imposing the duty to investigate and prosecute on successor 
regimes, and therefore to using such duties to gain access to the truth about pre-transition 
human rights abuses. These challenges arise from limits upon the temporal jurisdiction of 
international human rights courts.13 
 
When states only ratify human rights treaties 14  after the restoration of peace or 
democracy, complaints regarding pre-transition human rights abuses will ordinarily be 
inadmissible ratione temporis. This is rooted in the general principle of the non-retroactivity 
                                                 
4 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, The Right to Truth in the Americas (ACmHR, 2014). 
5 See D Groome, ‘The Right to Truth in the Fight against Impunity’ (2011) 29 Berkeley Journal of International 
Law 175, 175. 
6 For example contrast the more tempered conclusion of Y Naqvi, ‘The right to the truth in international law: fact 
or fiction?’ (2006) 88 IRRC 245 (discussed further below) with S Szoke-Burke, ‘Searching for the Right to 
Truth: the Impact of International Human Rights Law on National Transitional Justice Policies’ (2015) 33 
Berkley Journal of International law 526, who found that the right to truth is, ‘a legally binding (lex lata) norm.’ 
7 The term ‘jurisprudence’ here, and throughout, refers to the judicial and quasi-judicial findings of international 
human rights enforcement bodies in contentious proceedings. In addition to the findings of the European, Inter-
American and African Courts of Human (and Peoples’) Rights this includes, therefore, the ‘Views’ of the Human 
Rights Committee of the ICCPR. We shall also more briefly note relevant jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
and African Commissions on Human (and Peoples’) Rights. 
8 Teitel (n2) 72, noting that varied sources and forms of ‘transitional truths’; See also M Lawry-White, ‘The 
reparative effect of truth seeking in transitional justice’ (2015) 64 ICLQ 141, arguing for an ‘holistic’ approach 
to transitional justice and truth seeking rather than relying upon a single method (such as prosecutions alone, 
especially where for institutional or political reasons only a small number of alleged perpetrators could be tried). 
9 See Szoke-Burke (n6), 532. 
10 N Roht-Arriaza, ‘State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in 
International Law’ (1990) 78 California Law Review 449.  
11 D Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime’ (1991) 
100 The Yale Law Journal 2537. 
12 J Méndez, ‘Accountability for Past Abuses’ (1997) HRQ 255. 
13 This is not only a problem for the right to truth. There have been similar concerns about the inability of human 
rights courts to require the restitution of property taken prior to ratification of the relevant human rights treaty. 
See T Allen, ‘Restitution and transitional justice in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2007) 13 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 1; A Buyse, Post-Conflict Housing Restitution (Intersentia 2008); and JA Sweeney, 
‘Law and policy on post-conflict restitution’ in M Saul & JA Sweeney (eds), International Law and Post-
Conflict Reconstruction Policy (Routledge 2015). 
14 Or accept the contentious jurisdiction of the relevant enforcement body, if such acceptance is a step additional 
to ratification. 
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of treaties,15 and the way in which human rights courts and tribunals established by treaty 
have adjudicated upon disputes about their temporal jurisdiction.16  Both are connected to the 
extent of each state party’s consent to be bound by the treaty in question.  
 
In the jurisprudence, the date upon which the relevant human rights treaty or its 
enforcement mechanism becomes effective for a particular state party is often referred to as 
the ‘crucial’ or ‘critical’ date.17 The substantial inconsistency between human rights regimes 
on the extent to which their enforcement bodies have temporal jurisdiction over human rights 
violations rooted in events before the ‘crucial date’ has not yet been systematically 
investigated.18 It is shown here that despite the close association between truth-seeking and 
transitional justice, the capacity of international human rights law to vindicate the right to 
truth in respect of even notorious events before the ‘crucial date’ is worryingly uncertain.  
 
This piece examines the way in which the right to truth is both explicitly and 
implicitly vindicated in the global jurisprudence of the ICCPR Human Rights Committee,19 
and the regional jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights20 and European 
Court of Human Rights21 (the conclusion also addresses the less voluminous African regional 
jurisprudence).22 The general approach to the right to truth in each human rights regime is 
identified and analysed, followed by critical discussion of each regime’s ‘transitional 
                                                 
15 See Art 28 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 
1980) 1155 UNTS 331. 
16 See A Koroma, ‘Assertion of Jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice’ in P Capps et al (eds), 
Asserting Jurisdiction: International and European Legal Perspectives (Hart 2003), 196, noting, in relation to the 
International Court of Justice, that where its jurisdiction derives from a treaty, the potential retroactivity of the 
Court’s jurisdiction is separate to retroactivity of the obligations arising out of the treaty itself.   
17 See Šilih v Slovenia (App no 71463/01) (2009) 49 EHRR 996, para 140, discussed in depth below. 
18 Roht-Arriaza discussed, ‘the problem of successor governments’ but did not directly address the issue of 
admissibility ratione temporis in human rights law: Roht-Arriaza (n10), 432; Likewise Orentlicher’s analysis 
(n11) of prosecutory duties in respect of a ‘prior regime’ did not examine admissibility ratione temporis; and 
whilst Mendez found that the state’s obligation, ‘to disclose to the victims, their families, and society all that can 
be reliably established about [crimes against humanity]’ was correlative to, ‘a right to know the truth’ (Mendez, 
(n12) 261), he also did not examine the temporal problem in respect of many ‘past abuses’.  Eva Brems did 
examine it briefly in her analysis of the European Court of Human Rights’ transitional jurisprudence: E Brems, 
‘Transitional justice in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 5 International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 282, 287 – but without linking the duty to investigate to the emerging right to truth. Of 
studies of the right to truth per se, none of Groome (n5), Naqvi (n6), Szoke-Burke (n6) nor, more recently, 
Panepinto examined the temporal issue, even though Panepinto alluded to obligations upon ‘successor regimes’ 
to investigate ‘historic abuses’: A Panepinto, ‘The right to the truth in international law: The significance of 
Strasbourg’s contributions’ (2017) Legal Studies (Early View, available at < 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lest.12172/full>. Pinpoint references to this piece will refer to the 
Early View pdf.  
19 Established by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, and empowered to receive individual communications by the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976). 
20 Established by the American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 21 November 1969, entered into force 18 
July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123 (ACHR). The focus of this piece is upon the enforcement regime established by the 
ACHR. For members of the Organisation of American States that have not ratified the ACHR, a separate regime 
based upon the 1948 American Declaration and monitored by the Inter-American Commission applies: see 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1949) 43 AJIL Supp 133. 
21 Established by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention on Human Rights), as amended. 
22 The focus is upon identifying and analysing jurisprudence that is ‘functionally equivalent’ in its potential to 
vindicate the right to truth, rather than on comparing the jurisprudence on formally equivalent treaty provisions.  
On functionality see K Zweigert & H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative law (3rd edn, Oxford 1998), 34. 
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jurisprudence’23 on the admissibility ratione temporis of complaints seeking the truth about 
events before the ‘crucial date’.  The conclusion proposes a cohesive approach to the right to 
truth in transitional jurisprudence, rooted in the ‘underlying values’ of each human rights 
treaty. Thus, this piece is intended to make a contribution both to the vindication of victims’ 
and their next of kins’ rights to know about pre-transition human rights abuses, as well as to 
the developing literature on the transitional jurisprudence of human rights enforcement 
bodies. 
 
II. THE ELUSIVENESS OF THE RIGHT TO TRUTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
This section identifies that whilst there is a plethora of references to the right to truth in 
international soft law, its status as a legal right in public international law is moot. 
 
The UN’s Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action 
to Combat Impunity devote considerable attention to ‘The right to know’ and refer to the right 
to truth as being ‘imprescriptible’.24  Likewise the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law25 state that victims and 
their representatives should be able to ‘learn the truth’ about gross violations of international 
human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law. The Basic 
Principles and Guidelines, state in paragraph 22(b) that the verification of facts and full public 
disclosure of the truth is a necessary part of reparation for the types of abuse covered by 
them.26 
 
Several UN bodies, including the former Human Rights Commission, Human Rights 
Council and the General Assembly, have adopted resolutions stressing the importance of the 
right to truth in countering impunity and promoting human rights.27 In 2010 the General 
Assembly even proclaimed the 24th March as the ‘International Day for the Right to the Truth 
concerning Gross Human Rights Violations and for the Dignity of Victims.’ 28  These 
resolutions and soft-law instruments29 have been supported in practice by, amongst other 
things, the UN Human Rights Council’s decision in 2011 to appoint a Special Rapporteur on 
the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence.30  
  
                                                 
23 The term ‘transitional jurisprudence’ is used here to describe the jurisprudence of human rights enforcement 
bodies relating to societies in transition. See e.g. A Buyse & M Hamilton (eds), Transitional Jurisprudence and 
the ECHR (Cambridge 2011).  
24 UNCHR, ‘Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to 
combat impunity’, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/102. 
25 Adopted and proclaimed by UNGA Resolution 60/147 (16 December 2005), and also known as the ‘Joinet / 
Orentlicher Principles’. 
26 For a discussion of the Basic Principles and Guidelines, also known as the van Boven / Bassiouni Principles, 
see M Zwanenburg, ‘The van Boven / Bassiouni Principles: An Appraisal’ (2006) 24 NQHR 641. 
27 Human Rights Commission Resolution 2005/66 (20 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2005/66; Human 
Rights Council Resolution 12/12 (October 12 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/12/12; UNGA Resolution 68/165 (18 
December 2013) UN Doc A/RES/68/165. 
28 See UNGA Resolution 65/196 (21 December 2010) UN Doc A/RES/65/196. 
29 On the nature of soft-law, and the Basic Principles and Guidelines as an example thereof, see D Shelton, ‘Soft 
Law’ in David Armstrong (ed) Routledge Handbook of International Law (Routledge 2008), 72. 
30 Human Rights Council Resolution 18/7 (13 October 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/18/7.  
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There is thus clearly a groundswell of international opinion in favour of recognising a 
right to truth,31 but this does not translate straightforwardly into international legal rights and 
duties. Historical accounting may be achieved through a range of legal and administrative 
measures, including truth commissions 32  and lustration, 33  as well as through formal 
investigation,34 but not all are underpinned by a claimed ‘right’ to them. There is a thus a 
certain conceptual elusiveness - or expansiveness, even, to the right to truth, not least of all 
owing to it often being said to have both individual and collective dimensions.35 There may be 
vastly differing, and conflicting, techniques to vindicate each dimension. Indeed, this was 
precisely the situation faced by the South African Constitutional Court in 1996 when the 
family of murdered activist Steve Biko, supported by the Azanian Peoples Organization 
(AZAPO), argued that the power of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
to grant amnesties breached their right to have ‘justiciable disputes settled by a court of 
law’.36 
 
There is also a certain amount of legal elusiveness about the right to truth. The 2006 
UN Human Rights Commission ‘Study on the right to truth’ claimed to have found that the 
right to truth was an, ‘inalienable and autonomous right’,37 but its analysis conflated the 
historical and the legal bases of the right38 and failed to engage with the recognised sources of 
public international law at all.39 This is important because treaty law in this field is scant: 
whilst the First Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions states that the 
implementation of the rules on missing persons and the remains of the deceased should be, 
‘prompted mainly by the right of families to know the fate of their relatives’, 40  a 
comprehensive right to truth would need to address circumstances outside of an armed 
conflict;41 and whilst the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance enshrines that each victim has the right to know the truth regarding 
                                                 
31 Of course there are exceptions to this trend, including the Spanish pacto del olvido (pact of forgetting, in 
respect of the Franco regime), but even this may be dissipating: M Davis, ‘Is Spain Recovering Its Memory? 
Breaking the "Pacto del Olvido"’ (2005) 27 HRQ 858.  
32 See P Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenges of Truth Commissions (2nd edn, 
Routledge 2011). 
33 On lustration see A Czarnota, ‘Lustration, Decommunisation and the Rule of Law’ (2009) 1 Hague Journal on 
the Rule of Law 307; JA Sweeney, The European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era (Routledge 
2012), 127. 
34 It is also worth noting the impact of non-state actors in this regard: Hayner (n32), 16; L Bickford, ‘Unofficial 
Truth Projects’ (2007) 29 HRQ 994; G Visoka, ‘Arrested Truth: Transitional Justice and the Politics of 
Remembrance in Kosovo’ (2016) 8 Journal of Human Rights Practice 62. 
35 UN Human Rights Commission, ‘Study on the Right to Truth’ (8 February 2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/91 
(hereafter ‘2006 Study’), para 14. 
36 AZAPO v President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC). 
37 2006 Study (n35), ‘Summary’ and para 55.  
38 For example Section I of the 2006 Study is entitled, ‘Legal and historical basis for the right to truth.’ See 2006 
Study (n35), 4. 
39 Commonly understood to be stated authoritatively in Art 38 Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October April 1945) 3 Bevans 1179: see H Thirlway, ‘The Sources 
of International Law’ in M Evans (ed) International Law (4th edn, Oxford 2014) 94. 
40 Art 32, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 12 December 1977, entered into force 7 December 1979) 
1125 UNTS 3. 
41 Indeed this is expressly noted in the preamble to UN Human Rights Commission Res 2005/66 (n27), which 
states that, ‘adequate steps to identify victims should also be taken in situations not amounting to armed conflict, 
especially in cases of massive or systematic violations of human rights…’. See also Panepinto (n18), 3. 
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the circumstances of the disappearances,42 it is far from universally ratified,43 and not all 
claims for truth arise from disappearances.44  
 
It has been suggested, in the alternative, that the right to truth could be founded in 
customary international law,45 in part based upon the existence of ‘concurring jurisprudence’ 
in international human rights law.46 However as hinted above and detailed below, the existing 
human rights jurisprudence is not entirely ‘concurring’ – especially in respect of temporal 
jurisdiction over pre-transition human rights violations.  Moreover there are well known 
disagreements on the formation and identification of customary international law.47 Yasmin 
Naqvi’s comprehensive 2006 analysis of the right to truth in international law 48  applied 
Theodore Meron’s generous approach to the formation of customary international human 
rights law,49 but still found that the right, ‘stands somewhere on the threshold of a legal norm 
and a narrative device … [S]omewhere above a good argument and somewhere below a clear 
legal rule’. In legal terms, Naqvi’s suggestion that the right to truth might be a general 
principle of law50 is probably still the strongest claim that could be made for it in general 
public international law.51 
 
International human rights jurisprudence may sidestep at least some of the elusiveness 
of a free-standing public international legal right to truth. Such jurisprudence derives from a 
series of self-contained treaty regimes with their own arbiters employing their own rules of 
interpretation, and where judicial activism may result in the discovery and acceptance of new 
principles – including on the extent of the arbiters’ own temporal jurisdiction.52 There are 
certainly questions about the balance between textualist and evolutive (‘living instrument’)53 
                                                 
42 Art 24 (2), International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (adopted 
20 December 2006, entered into effect 23 December 2010) 2716 UNTS 3.  
43 There are currently 56 States Parties to the Convention, and a total of 96 signatory states. It has not been 
ratified by Russia, China, the USA, or the UK: UN Treaty Series, ‘International Convention for the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance’ < 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-16&chapter=4&clang=_en>. 
44 See also Panepinto (n18), 5. 
45 UN Human Rights Commission, ‘Eighth Annual Report and List of States which, Since 1 January 1985, Have 
Proclaimed, Extended or Terminated a State of Emergency’ (26 June 1995) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/20*, 
para 40 (hereafter ‘Despouy Report’, after its author); Szoke-Burke (n6), 539. 
46 Despouy Report (n45). 
47 Note the ongoing work of the International Law Commission on this topic, summarising much of the existing 
practice and scholarship on this topic: International Law Commission, ‘Analytical Guide to the Work of the 
International Law Commission: Identification of customary international law’ (ILC 30 June 2017) < 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_13.shtml>. See also the discussion in Panepinto, (n18), 19 et seq of pdf. 
48 Naqvi (n6).  
49 T Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law as Customary Law (Clarendon 1989), 94. For criticism of this 
approach see B Simma & P Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens and General 
principles’ (1992) 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law 82. 
50 Naqvi (n6), 268. 
51 Naqvi (n6), 273. 
52 E Bjorge, The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties (Oxford 2014), although note that at 168 et seq Bjorge 
argues that the evolutive approach to temporal jurisdiction taken in Šilih v Slovenia (n17) was superfluous as 
temporal jurisdiction could have been established on more traditional grounds. 
53 See Tyrer v UK (App no 5856/72) (1978) 2 EHRR 1, para 31.  Note also that Art 32(2) ECHR and Art 3(2) of 
the 1998 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights expressly recognize the authority of each court to decide upon disputes as 
to its jurisdiction: Protocol to the African Charter (adopted 10 June 1998, entered into force 25 January 2004) < 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f4b19c14.html>. Although, perhaps oddly, when the 1998 Protocol is replaced 
by the 2008 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights there will be no direct 
equivalent provision governing the new African Court: see Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights (adopted 1 July 2008, not in force) < http://www.refworld.org/docid/4937f0ac2.html>.  
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approaches,54 but these are capable of being resolved (albeit sometimes over some time)55 by 
the relevant enforcement bodies. Whilst the regimes are self-contained they may provide 
inspiration to each other through judicial collaboration and trans-judicial dialogue, both in the 
development of substantive standards as well as forms of legal reasoning.56 Such dialogue 
may serve to guard against excessive legal fragmentation, 57  and the resulting broadly 
supranational law of human rights may fairly be described as cosmopolitan in nature.58 
 
In the next sections we shall examine the extent to which global and regional human 
rights enforcement bodies have, in both their ‘general’ and ‘transitional’ jurisprudence, 
developed functionally equivalent approaches to the right to truth. It is shown that although 
there is much in common between the different human rights regimes, there are significant 
anomalies. The article will not address the related but distinct issue of human rights 
enforcement bodies being called upon, expressly or impliedly, to settle major debates about 
the past (such as the lawfulness of the Soviet Union annexing the Baltic states in 1940;59 or 
whether the persecution of Armenians in 1915 amounted to genocide).60  
 
III. THE RIGHT TO TRUTH AT THE ICCPR HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 
 
A. General Approach to the Right to Truth 
 
In its 1983 View in the case of Quinteros v Uruguay the ICCPR Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) not only found violations of the initial victim’s rights in respect of her disappearance 
and presumed death, but in respect of her mother stated that, 
The Committee understands the anguish and stress caused to the mother by the 
disappearance of her daughter and by the continuing uncertainty concerning her fate 
and whereabouts. The author has the right to know what has happened to her daughter. 
In these respects, she too is a victim of the violations of the Covenant suffered by her 
daughter in particular, of article 7 [ICCPR].61   
 
This is the earliest articulation of a right to the truth (or right to know) in international 
human rights jurisprudence,62 and it is anchored in the right to freedom from torture, cruel or 
                                                                                                                                                        
Whilst there is no formal equivalent to these provisions in the treaties founding the ICCPR Human Rights 
Committee and American Court of Human Rights, we shall see that there is no shortage of jurisprudence on 
those bodies’ jurisdiction. 
54 For further discussion of this principle see e.g. G Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Oxford 2007). 
55 Note e.g. Dembour’s criticism of the slow evolution of rights for transsexuals in European human rights law: 
M Dembour, Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections on the European Convention (Cambridge 2006), 238.  
56 See G Canivet, ‘Trans-Judicial Dialogue in a Global World’ in S Muller and S Richards (eds), Highest Courts 
and Globalisation (Hague Academic Press 2010). 
57 Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ (13 April 2006) 
A/CN.4/L.682. 
58 H P Glenn, The Cosmopolitan State (OUP 2013), 244. 
59 Note the opposing interventions of Russia and Lithuania on the annexation of the Baltic states in Kononov v 
Latvia (GC) (App no 36376/04) (2010) ECHR 667. 
60 Note the Turkish intervention in Perinçek v Switzerland (GC) (App no 27510/08) (2016) 63 EHRR 6, 
discussing the Armenian genocide. 
61 Quinteros v Uruguay (Comm No 107/1981), View of 21 July 1983, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2, 138 (1990), para 
14 (emphasis added). 
62 Although to be fair as far back as 1977 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights had commented that 
disappearances affect not only the rights of the disappeared person, but also constituted ‘a true form of torture for 
the victims’ family and friends because of the uncertainty that they experience as to the fate of the victim’: Inter-
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inhuman treatment. This finding had been influential upon the development of the Inter-
American 63  and European 64  jurisprudence in respect of their equivalent rights, discussed 
further below. It also formed a central part of the basis of Orentlicher’s interpretation of the 
HRC’s jurisprudence, under which she found that, ‘prosecution leading to an appropriate 
sanction is generally required when a disappearance, an extra-legal execution, or torture is 
credibly alleged’.65 Thus, the Quinteros View is an important step towards demonstrating the 
connection between state obligations to investigate and prosecute, and an individual right to 
truth. The HRC has continued to show the importance of Article 7 ICCPR to the next of kin in 
cases of enforced disappearances, although not always expressly invoking the right to truth or 
the right to know.66 
 
In the disappearance case of Saadoun v Algeria the HRC also examined the Article 
2(3) ICCPR right to a remedy.  Following a 2005 referendum the Algerian authorities had 
promulgated a ‘Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation’, which prohibited, with the 
threat of imprisonment, the initiation of legal proceedings in respect of the ‘national tragedy’, 
viz. the 1991 to 1999 Algerian civil war that provided the backdrop to the disappearance at 
issue.67 The State had argued that the Charter, which did offer a route to compensation in 
relation to presumed deaths connected to the ‘national tragedy’,68 reflected a, ‘desire to avoid 
confrontation in the courts, media outpourings and political score-settling.’69 Whatever the 
merits of this approach, the failure to conduct a thorough and effective investigation was 
found to constitute a violation of Article 2(3) ICCPR. 70  This is significant because imposing 
investigatory duties in this way also assists in vindicating the right to truth for the next of kin: 
in fact within the Inter-American system the right to truth has been expressly ‘subsumed’ 
within the right to a remedy, as we shall see below.71  
 
The right to a remedy in the ICCPR has some important limitations to it.  Whilst, as 
seen in the Saadoun View immediately above, failure by a State party to investigate 
allegations of human rights violations can in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the 
Covenant,72 the Article 2 ICCPR right to a remedy may only be raised in respect of an already 
                                                                                                                                                        
American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
1977’, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.43, Doc. 21 corr. 1 (1978), Part II; note also the discussion in Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, The Right to Truth in the Americas (n4), 28.  
63 See the ‘Street Children’ (Villagran-Morales et al) v Guatemala, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 19 
November 1999, Series C No 63, para 176; Bámaca Velásquez v Guatemala (Merits), Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, 25 November 2000, Series C No 70, para 164; Myrna Mack Chang v Guatemala, Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, 25 November 2003, Series C, No 101, para 274. 
64 See Kurt v Turkey (App No 24276/94) (1999) 27 EHRR 373, para 130 et seq.  
65 Orentlicher (n11), 2575. 
66 See e.g. Sarma v Sri Lanka (Comm No 950/2000), View of 16 July 2003, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000 
(2003), para 9.5; Boucherf v Algeria (Comm No 1196/2003), View of 30 March 2006, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/86/D/1196/2003 (2006), para 9.7; Saadoun v Algeria, (Comm No 1806/2008), View of 22 March 2013, 
UN Doc CCPR/C/107/D/1806/2008 (2013), para 8.5. 
67 See Saadoun (n66), para 2.12; BBC, ‘Algeria country profile’ (BBC, 27 January 2017) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14118852>. 
68 Saadoun (n66), para 4.6. 
69 Ibid, para 4.7. 
70 Ibid, para 8.8. 
71 See the discussion at (n115) below. 
72 See also HRC, ‘General Comment 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties 
to the Covenant’ UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 1326 (2004). 
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established violation of another substantive right within the HRC’s jurisdiction.73  This is 
significant in relation to the discussion of admissibility ratione temporis below.  
 
It is worth noting that the HRC also usually invokes Article 2(3) ICCPR towards the 
end of the text of its Views (whether or not it has found a separate violation of it) as the 
foundation for the state’s obligation to provide a remedy for whichever other rights have been 
violated.74 This has parallels with the reparations phase of cases at the Inter-American Court, 
based on Article 63(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, in which the right to 
truth expressly plays a significant role.75 Likewise it is comparable to the remedial obligations 
emanating from Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights, under which 
Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court in respect 
of cases to which they are party.  These provisions are discussed further below.  
 
This section has shown that the right to truth has two main dimensions in the HRC’s 
general jurisprudence, expressly underpinning findings on inhuman treatment of the next of 
kin; and implicitly doing so in relation to the right to a remedy.   
 
B. Admissibility ratione temporis and Transitional Jurisprudence 
 
The HRC has conclusively held that, where there are no issues of admissibility ratione 
temporis, successor regimes may be held responsible for the actions of their totalitarian 
predecessors.  For example in the case of Hugo Rodriguez v Uruguay, decided in 1994 and 
concerning events commencing in 1983, the HRC found that it, ‘could not agree with the 
State party that it has no obligation to investigate violations of Covenant rights by a prior 
regime.’76  Uruguay had ratified the ICCPR and its First Optional Protocol in 1970, and so the 
HRC clearly had temporal jurisdiction.  
 
The Hugo Rodriguez case did not address the right to truth expressly, but it and similar 
cases demonstrate that successor regimes may have significant investigatory duties under the 
Covenant (in which the right to truth may be subsumed) when admissibility ratione temporis 
is not an issue. In cases where the HRC has addressed admissibility ratione temporis the right 
to a remedy will not be available for pre-ratification human rights abuses that are otherwise 
outside the temporal jurisdiction of the HRC, which is in sharp contrast to the Inter-American 
jurisprudence discussed below. This can be seen in the 1990 admissibility decision in S.E. v 
Argentina,77 concerning a 1976 disappearance during the so-called ‘dirty war’. The Covenant 
and its Optional Protocol only entered into force for Argentina in November 198678 so there 
                                                 
73 H.G.P. & S.P. v Trinidad and Tobago, (Comm No 268/1987), Decision of 3 November 1987, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/37/D/268/1987 (1989), para 6.2.  
74 See Saadoun (n66), para 10; Sankara v Burkino Faso (Comm No 1159/2003), View of 28 March 2006, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/86/D/1159/2003 (2006), para 14. 
75 See Myrna Mack Chang (n63), para 274, discussed in the text at (n101) below. 
76 Hugo Rodriguez v Uruguay, (Comm No 322/1988), View of 19 July 1994, UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988 
(1994), para 12.3; see also Blanco v Nicaragua (Comm No 328/1988), View of 20 July 1994, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/51/D/328/1988 (1994), para 5.3, where the HRC found that, ‘the authorities of any State party to the 
Covenant are under an obligation to investigate alleged human rights violations and to make available 
appropriate judicial remedies and compensation to victims of such violations, even if they are attributable to a 
previous administration’.  
77 S.E. v. Argentina, (Comm No 275/1988), Decision of 26 March 1990, UN Doc CCPR/C /38/D/275/1988 
(1990). 
78 Ibid. 
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were no substantive violations to which the right to a remedy could be attached, and the 
communication was declared inadmissible.79   
 
The S.E. decision is undoubtedly harsh. In addition to invoking Article 2, the author of 
the complaint also protested that the disappearance of her children was never fully 
investigated.80  Well before the S.E. decision the HRC had held that it is empowered to 
consider a communication when the measures complained of, although they occurred before 
the crucial date, continued to have effects which themselves constitute a violation of the 
Covenant after that date.81 Even in the S.E. decision the HRC reminded Argentina that, ‘it is 
under an obligation, in respect of violations occurring or continuing after the entry into force 
of the Covenant, thoroughly to investigate alleged violations and to provide remedies where 
applicable, for victims or their dependants.’ 82  Given that the author’s children were still 
missing it seems strange that there were no continuing violations in this case.  
 
The HRC jurisprudence on this point is, however, not altogether consistent, and in 
other cases it has accepted that a disappearance can have continuing effects. In Sarma v Sri 
Lanka, decided on the merits in 2003, the HRC examined a complaint involving the author 
and his son’s removal from their home, by the military, in 1990, after which the son remained 
missing.83 The Optional Protocol only entered into effect for Sri Lanka in 1997,84 and Sri 
Lanka had also entered a declaration restricting the HRC's competence to events following the 
entry into force of the Optional Protocol. Despite this, for the purposes of admissibility, the 
HRC accepted that the author’s allegations may have contained violations that ‘occurred or 
continued’ after the Optional Protocol entered into force for Sri Lanka.85 On the merits the 
HRC found that the son’s apparently continuing detention revealed a violation of Article 9 
ICCPR ‘in its entirety’ (right to liberty and security of the person),86 as well as a violation of 
Article 7 both with regard to the son’s indefinite incommunicado detention and the next of 
kin’s anguish and stress.87 The violation of Article 7 in respect of the next of kin was in 
recognition of the continuing uncertainty concerning the son’s fate and whereabouts, which 
was the source of anguish and stress.88 The HRC was therefore able to invoke Article 2(3) to 
require Sri Lanka to provide an effective remedy. 89   Thus, in the Sarma View, both 
dimensions of the right to truth were mutually reinforcing and resulted in a clear obligation to 
investigate a disappearance that commenced before the crucial date.  
 
                                                 
79 See also RAVN et al v Argentina, (Comm Nos 343, 344 and 345/1988), Decision of 26 March 1990, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/38/D/344/1988 (1990).  
80 S.E. (n77), para 3.2. 
81 Lovelace v Canada, (Comm No R.6/24), View of 30 July 1981, UN Doc Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at 166 
(1981), para 7.3. 
82 S.E. (n77), para 5.4. 
83 Sarma v Sri Lanka (n66), para 2.1 et seq. Note that the author actually thought he caught a glimpse of his son 
in a military van in 1991, but never subsequently.  
84 Ibid, para 1.7. But note that the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka continued until the military defeat of the 
‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’ in 2009, so this is hardly a paradigmatic ‘transitional’ case. For a basic 
timeline see BBC, ‘Sri Lanka Country Profile’ (BBC, 18 April 2017) < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-
asia-11999611>.  
85 Ibid, para 6.2. 
86 Ibid, para 9.4. 
87 Ibid, para 9.5. 
88 Ibid para 9.5. 
89 Ibid, para 11. 
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There is a further strand to the HRC’s jurisprudence on continuing violations, which 
may also impact upon the right to truth in transitional contexts. In addition to the ‘occurred or 
continued’ formulation noted above, the HRC has also stated that,  
A continuing violation is to be interpreted as an affirmation, after the entry into force 
of the Optional Protocol, by act or by clear implication, of previous violations by the 
State party.90  
 
It was in this way that, in its 2006 View in Mariam Sankara and others v Burkina 
Faso,91 the HRC established temporal jurisdiction in respect of the alleged inhuman treatment 
of the family members of the assassinated president of Burkina Faso, Thomas Sankara, who 
was killed in 1987. Sankara himself had seized power in 1983, and Burkina Faso only began 
transitioning to democracy in the 1990s,92 in part evidenced by the ICCPR and the Optional 
Protocol entering into force for Burkina Faso in 1999. The HRC separated the claims in 
respect of Sankara rights from those of his family. Although Thomas Sankara’s death in 1987 
may have involved the violation of several articles of the Covenant, complaints about it were 
inadmissible ratione temporis.93 However, as to his next of kin’s rights, the failure to conduct 
an inquiry into the death, and the continued failure to correct Sankara’s death certificate 
(which quite falsely stated that he died of natural causes) gave rise to alleged violations after 
the entry into force of the Covenant.94 Thus on the merits the HRC found a violation of 
Article 7 ICCPR in respect of the anguish caused by the lack of investigation into the situation 
and, citing Quinteros, noted that Thomas Sankara’s family had ‘the right to know the 
circumstances of his death’.95 In this way the HRC’s transitional jurisprudence upheld the 
right to truth in respect of events some way prior to Burkina Faso’s commencement of 
transition to democracy. 
  
The requirement, in some cases, for some form of affirmation or perpetuation of a 
violation that occurred prior to the crucial date has led to Views that are difficult to reconcile 
with those based on the ‘occurred or continued’ formulation of continuing violations. For 
example, in the 2009 decision in Cifuentes v Chile, the HRC found that the author’s complaint 
about a disappearance that began in 1981 (before Chile ratified the Optional Protocol) was 
inadmissible because the author had made, ‘no reference to any action by the State party after 
[the crucial date] that would constitute a perpetuation by the State party of the enforced 
disappearance of her son.’96 Chile had ratified the Optional Protocol with a declaration very 
similar to that seen in the Sarma case, restricting the competence of the HRC to acts after the 
Protocol came into effect for Chile.97 Yet, in the Sarma case, we saw that the HRC identified 
                                                 
90 Konye v Hungary, (Comm No 520/1992), Decision of 4 April 1994, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/520/1992 (1994), 
para 6.4. A slightly different formulation has occasionally also been used, according to which, ‘A persistent 
violation is understood to mean the continuation of violations which the State party committed previously, either 
through actions or implicitly’: see Kurowski v Poland, (Comm No 872/1999), Decision of 18 March 2003, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/77/D/872/1999, para 6.4. 
91 Sankara (n74). 
92 See BBC, ‘Burkina Faso profile – timeline’ (BBC, 8 June 2017) < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
13072857>. 
93 Ibid, para 6.2, summarising the earlier admissibility decision. 
94 Ibid, para 6.3. 
95 Ibid, para 12.2. 
96 Cifuentes v Chile, (Comm No 1536/2006), Decision of 28 July 2009, UN Doc A/64/40 vol. II (2009), Annex 
VIII.J, 491, para 8.5; see also a virtually identical inadmissibility finding in Yurich v Chile, (Comm No 
1078/2002), Decision of 2 November 2005, UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/1078/2002 (2005), para 6.4. 
97 Indeed, the declaration in Cifuentes (Ibid) is notable because, despite being couched as a limitation on the 
HRC’s jurisdiction, its terms were that the HRC competence would apply, ‘in respect of acts occurring after the 
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that the disappearance gave rise to facts ‘occurring or continuing’ after the crucial date, which 
disclosed violations of the Covenant. 
 
Whilst the Sarma View was adopted unanimously, there was significant dissent in the 
Cifuentes decision. The most striking dissent was by HRC members Keller and Salvioli, 
according to whom,  
The practice of enforced disappearance has given rise to the formulation of new rights 
and their introduction, through evolutive interpretation, into these general [human 
rights] instruments; the “right to the truth” is one example.  
 
They continued that under the ICCPR the right to truth, 
arises in connection with the right to an effective remedy (art. 2, para. 3 (a)), read in 
conjunction with the general obligation to respect and to ensure to all individuals the 
rights recognized in the Covenant … 
 
[The] right to the truth entails the right to obtain a clarification from the competent 
State bodies of the events constituting violation(s) and the persons responsible for 
them. Accordingly, the State must undertake an effective investigation of enforced 
disappearances in order to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and 
instigators of such violations.  
 
Members Keller and Salvioli also questioned why the majority had not explored the case from 
the perspective of the author’s rights under Article 7 ICCPR. 
 
From this section we can conclude that the status of the right to truth in the transitional 
jurisprudence of the HRC is somewhat mixed. Whilst the Quinteros line of cases (on denial of 
the next of kin’s ‘rights to know’ as inhuman treatment) has been applied to historical 
disappearances and killings, such as in the Sarma and Sankara and cases, in others such as 
S.E. and Cifuentes this dimension was omitted altogether. Likewise there seems to be 
disagreement about the correct test for establishing temporal jurisdiction, with some Views 
and decisions focusing on whether there are effects that have ‘occurred or continued’ after the 
crucial date; and others requiring an act of affirmation. Moreover, the Art 2(3) ICCPR right to 
a remedy may only be invoked alongside another established violation, and thus cannot be 
used alone as the foundation for gaining the truth about alleged abuse occurring before the 
crucial date.  
 
The View in Sarma and the dissents in the Cifuentes decision present a more 
preferable view of continuing obligations arising from disappearances, which most effectively 
secures the rights of the next of kin, and also more closely resembles the approach of the 
Inter-American Court discussed in the next section. Indeed we saw that in Cifuentes dissent 
HRC members Keller and Salvioli expressly linked Article 2(3) ICCPR to the right to truth. In 
2011 Keller became a judge at the European Court of Human Rights, and further below we 
shall see that, via contributing to two separate opinions in particular,98  judge Keller has 
continued to advocate for greater recognition of the right to truth. 
                                                                                                                                                        
entry into force for [Chile] of the Optional Protocol [in August 1992] or, in any event, to acts which began after 
11 March 1990’ – i.e. over two years before the Protocol came into effect for Chile. 
98 See the joint concurring opinion of Judges Tulkens, Spielmann, Sicilianos and Keller in El-Masri v the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (App No 39630/09) (2013) 57 EHRR 25 and the joint partly dissenting opinion 
of Judges Ziemele, de Gaetano, Laffranque and Keller in Janowiec and Others v Russia (GC) (App Nos 
55508/07 and 29520/09) (2014) 58 EHRR 30. These are discussed further below. 
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IV. THE RIGHT TO TRUTH IN THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
 
A. General Approach to the Right to Truth 
 
The development of the right to truth in the Inter-American human rights system is 
intertwined with its approach to the phenomenon of enforced disappearances. In its first 
judgment in contentious proceedings, in the case of Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, the 
Inter-American Court (IACtHR) found that enforced disappearances cause, ‘a multiple and 
continuous violation of many rights under the [American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR)]’.99 These include the right to personal liberty, right to life, and right to integrity of 
the person (including freedom from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment: Article 5 
ACHR). Citing the overarching Article 1 duty to ensure respect for human rights, the IACtHR 
found that the duty to investigate disappearances ‘continues as long as there is uncertainty 
about the fate of the person who has disappeared.’100   
 
Just as with the HRC, the finding that disappearances have a continuing dimension 
will be important to the discussion of admissibility ratione temporis; and we shall return to 
this below. For now, it is important to emphasise the continuing remedial obligations imposed 
upon Honduras through Article 63(1) ACHR because, in later cases, these have been 
expressly connected to the right to truth. The IACtHR has identified that the right to truth, 
‘constitutes an important means of reparation’, creating expectations for both for the next of 
kin and society as a whole; such that there must be an effective investigation of grave human 
rights violations, which must be made known to the public.101 Indeed this has led not only to 
detailed guidance on the scope of investigations that must be carried out, but also on public 
acknowledgements and memorialisation. 102  Interestingly in its findings on investigatory 
obligations as an act of reparation the IACtHR has stated that the work of a truth commission, 
‘neither completes nor substitutes for the State’s obligation to establish the truth and to ensure 
the judicial determination of individual or State responsibilities also by judicial 
proceedings,’ 103  – although such initiatives can, ‘contribute to the construction and 
preservation of the historical memory.’104 
 
Turning now to findings on the merits, in common with the HRC the Inter-American 
system has recognised that the failure to expose the truth about gross violations of human 
rights may cause free-standing human rights violations in respect of the next of kin. Again 
like the HRC this jurisprudence has two principal dimensions,105 involving both the right to 
humane treatment and the right to a remedy. 
                                                 
99 Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 29 July 1988, Series C No 4, para 
155. 
100 Ibid, para 181. 
101 Myrna Mack Chang (n63), para 274-275; see also Bámaca-Velásquez v Guatemala (Reparations and Costs), 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 22 February 2002, Series C No 91, para 73 et seq.  
102 See Rodríguez Vera et al v Colombia, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 14 November 2014, Series C 
No 287, para 570 et seq, including the requirement that the respondent state prepare, exhibit and disseminate an 
audio-visual documentary about the events of the case. In the Myrna Mack Chang case, amongst several other 
measures of reparation, the IACtHR required that a well-known street or square in Guatemala City be named in 
honour of the victim: Myrna Mack Chang (n63), para 286. 
103 See e.g. The Massacres of El Mozote and nearby places v El Salvador, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, 25 October 2012, Series C No 252, para 316.  
104 Rodríguez Vera (n102), para 88. 
105 For the sake of thoroughness, a couple of outlying cases need to be acknowledged. First, in the case of Gudiel 
Álvarez et al v Guatemala, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 20 November 2012, Series C No 253 the 
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The IACtHR’s approach to the Article 5 ACHR right to humane treatment is both 
formally and functionally comparable to the HRC’s approach to Article 7 ICCPR in the 
Quinteros View.  Thus the IACtHR has held that, ‘the violation of the mental and moral 
integrity of the next of kin is precisely a direct consequence of the forced disappearance.’106 In 
this regard the IACtHR has taken into account circumstances in which the respondent state 
has obstructed the next of kin’s ‘efforts to learn the truth of the facts.’107  
 
Whilst the Article 5 jurisprudence developed in respect of disappearances, it has been 
applied to other forms of human rights violation. Thus, in the Barrios Family case, concerning 
a series of killings by the Venezuelan authorities, the ACtHR reiterated that, ‘the next of kin 
of the victims of human rights violations may, in turn, be victims.’108 In this way continued 
impunity, resulting from a lack of judicial response to clarify the facts of a massacre, can 
constitute a ‘new traumatic impact’,109 capable of causing infringement of Article 5 ACHR in 
respect of survivors and next of kin.110 Whilst the connection to the right to truth is not 
express, this line of jurisprudence is still significant because it mirrors the jurisprudence at the 
HRC that does refer to the ‘right to know’.111  
 
The second dimension of the ACtHR’s jurisprudence relating to the right to truth is 
where the next of kin have complained about a lack of investigation and information, using 
Articles 8 and 25 taken together (the right to a fair trial and right to judicial protection), in 
relation to the overarching Article 1 obligation to respect and ensure rights. This dimension is 
functionally comparable to, but more far reaching than, the obligations emanating from the 
right to a remedy in the ICCPR and, in the Inter-American system, the right to truth has been 
invoked more expressly. The Inter-American Commission has stated that the general 
obligation in Article 1 ACHR entails that ‘the "right to the truth" arises as a basic and 
indispensable consequence for all States Parties’,112 having both individual and collective 
dimensions.113 The IACtHR, however, has thus far declined to recognise the right to truth as 
an autonomous right (although the Concurring Opinion of Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor 
Poisot in the recent case of Rodríguez Vera et al v Columbia makes a strong case for it).114 
Instead, the IACtHR has frequently repeated that, 
                                                                                                                                                        
IACtHR made a rare express Article 5 finding on the right to truth, where the state had failed to provide 
important information to a truth commission established after the end of the Guatemalan civil war. The failure to 
cooperate fully with the truth commission (that the state itself had established) prevented family members from 
knowing the ‘historical truth’, and amounted to a further violation of Article 5 ACHR. Second, in the case of 
Gomes Lund et al v Brazil, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 24 November 2010, Series C No 219 the 
specific facts of the case led to the IACtHR examining the right to truth within Articles 8 and 25 ACHR 
alongside Article 13 – the right to free expression, and the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds. Nevertheless, the IACtHR does not generally underpin its findings on the right to truth with 
Article 13 ACHR.   
106 Bámaca Velásquez (Merits) (n63), para 160.  
107 Ibid, para 165. 
108 The Barrios Family v Venezuela, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 24 November 2011, Series C No 
237, para 301. 
109 The ‘Las Dos Erres’ Massacre v Guatemala, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 24 November 2009, 
Series C No 211, para 213. 
110 Ibid, para 217. 
111 Quinteros (n61), para 14. 
112 Lucio Parada Cea et al v El Salvador, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 27 January 1999, 
Report No. 1/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc 6 rev, para 150. 
113 Ibid, para 151. 
114 Rodríguez Vera (n102). 
Accepted for publication in International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2018) 
(c) James A Sweeney 2017 
the right to the truth is subsumed in the right of the victim or his next of kin to obtain 
clarification of the facts relating to the violations and the corresponding 
responsibilities from the competent State organs, through the investigation and 
prosecution established in Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention.115 
  
This is clear also in cases on other forms of human rights violation (i.e. in addition to 
disappearances). Thus amongst its findings on Articles 8 and 25 ACHR in the Myrna Mack 
Chang case, the IACtHR examined the way in which the Guatemalan judicial system had 
allowed the state to delay proceedings in relation to the extra-legal execution of a prominent 
anthropologist as part of a covert military intelligence operation, in 1990.116 The IACtHR 
observed that the failure to abide by the standards required by Articles 8 and 25 ACHR gave 
rise to a violation of the international obligation of the State to prevent and protect human 
rights; and it had also, ‘abridge[d] the right of the victim and the next of kin of the victim to 
know the truth of what happened.’117  
 
B. Admissibility ratione temporis and Transitional Jurisprudence 
 
In the Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras judgment the IACtHR established that responsibility 
for human rights violations exists independently of changes of government, even where the 
new government, ‘may be much more respectful of those rights than that of the government in 
power when the violations occurred.’118 Thus, in Ruti Teitel’s analysis the duties recognised 
in Velásquez Rodríguez were able to ‘transcend and bridge’ the different regimes.119 Likewise 
both Roht-Arriaza and Orentlicher noted the IACtHR’s findings in Velásquez Rodríguez as 
part of their evidence in favour of the existence of a duty to investigate and prosecute grave 
violations of human rights. 120   However, Honduras had ratified the ACHR in 1977 and 
accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the IACtHR from September 9 1981 – just before the 
enforced disappearance of Manfredo Rodríguez on September 12th 1981. Thus, there was no 
question of inadmissibility ratione temporis.  Nevertheless the recognition that, where there 
are no temporal barriers to jurisdiction, successor regimes have investigatory obligations is 
both significant and comparable to that see at the HRC in Hugo Rodriguez v Uruguay, noted 
above. 
 
Decided on the merits in 1998, the case of Blake v Guatemala concerned the 
disappearance and killing of a US journalist, Nicholas Blake, and his photographer Griffith 
Davis in 1985. Guatemala only accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the IACtHR in 
1987,121 after the military junta of General Efraín Ríos Montt had been overthrown (but whilst 
the country was still embroiled in its civil war, which lasted from 1960 to 1996).122 In this 
case, there was a very real issue of admissibility. The IACtHR resolved it123 by accepting that 
                                                 
115 Bámaca Velásquez v Guatemala (Merits) (n63), para 201 (emphasis added); see also Chumbipuma Aguirre et 
al v Peru (the Barrios Altos Case), Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 14 March 2001, Series C No 75, 
para. 48; see also similar language in Rodríguez Vera (n102), para 509 amongst others. 
116 Myrna Mack Chang (n63), para 140. 
117 Ibid, para 211. 
118 Velásquez Rodríguez (n99), para 184. 
119 Teitel (n2), 125. 
120 Roht-Arriaza (n10), 467; Orentlicher (n11), 2576 et seq. 
121 Blake v Guatemala (Merits), Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 24 January 1998, Series C No 36, para 
2.  
122 BBC, ‘Guatemala country profile’ (BBC, 3 January 2017) < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-
19635877>.  
123 Note that the IACtHR examined admissibility ratione temporis in both its 1996 judgment on Preliminary 
Objections, and in the 1998 judgment on the merits, reaching the same result. See Blake (Merits) (n121) and 
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even though it would not have jurisdiction to attribute state responsibility for violations of 
Blake’s right to liberty under Article 7 ACHR124 or his right to life under Article 4,125 the 
disappearance marked the beginning of a continuing situation, 126  involving ‘actions and 
effects’ after the crucial date, which could give rise to violations in respect of the next of 
kin.127 The IACtHR thus found a violation of Article 8 and Article 5 ACHR, in relation to 
Article 1 ACHR.128  In other words, both dimensions of the right to truth were, at least 
implicitly, vindicated (deriving from the right to a remedy and the right to humane treatment).  
 
Whilst the Blake case did not expressly mention the right to truth, in later cases on 
disappearances where temporal jurisdiction has been established in a similar way, the right to 
truth has underpinned violations of Article 5, and Articles 8 and 25, in the same way as those 
cases without a temporal dimension noted in the previous section.129 It has even done so 
where states have reservations preventing the IACtHR from considering the continuing effects 
of events prior to acceptance of the contentious jurisdiction of the court: the post-acceptance 
acts or omissions of the state can still be ‘independent facts’ sufficient to establish a free-
standing violation of the ACHR in respect of the next of kin.130  
 
This is crucial because it has allowed the IACtHR also to vindicate the right to truth 
through findings on Article 5, and Articles 8 and 25 ACHR, concerning the failure to 
investigate human rights violations before the crucial date other than disappearances (i.e. 
where the triggering event is ‘instantaneous’ rather than continuing). This can be seen in the 
judgment in Moiwana Community v Suriname,131 concerning a massacre in 1986 during the 
military dictatorship of Dési Bouterse. 132  Suriname argued that the complaint should be 
inadmissible because it had accepted the jurisdiction of the IACtHR in 1987 and only forced 
disappearances, which were not at issue, had a continuing dimension.133 To the contrary, the 
IACtHR held that once the allegation of a massacre had been made an obligation to 
investigate, prosecute and punish arose; and that the IACtHR was competent to assess 
compliance with that obligation from the date on which Suriname recognised the competence 
of the Court. Thus actions or omissions of the State in respect of its investigation into the 
massacre, commenced in 1989 - after the crucial date, fell within the temporal jurisdiction of 
the IACtHR.134   
                                                                                                                                                        
Blake v Guatemala (Preliminary Objections), Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2 July 1996, Series C No 
27.  
124 Blake (Merits) (n121), 82. 
125 Ibid, para 86. 
126 Ibid, para 67. 
127 It is also worth mentioning the Separate Opinion of Judge AA Cançado Trindade in Blake (Merits)(n121): in 
the case of forced disappearances he argued against the application of ‘a rigid postulate of the law of treaties’ 
(namely the rules on admissibility ratione temporis). ‘Human rights’, he argued, ‘are demanding a revitalisation 
of the law of treaties’. 
128 Blake (Merits) (n121), para 124. Note that there was no violation of Art 25 ACHR in this case, for the reasons 
given in paras 98-104. 
129 See e.g. Heliodoro Portugal v Panama, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 12 August 2008, Series C No 
186, para 146-147 on Arts 8 & 25, and para 175 on Art 5; Gomes Lund (n105), para 200 on Arts 8 & 25, and 
para 242 on Art 5.  
130 Serrano-Cruz Sisters v El Salvador (Preliminary Objections), Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 23 
November 2004, Series C No 118, para 84.  
131 Moiwana Community v Suriname, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 15 June 2005, Series C No 124. 
132 Under President Venetiaan, Suriname officially apologised for the massacred in 2006. However, Bouterse 
became president again in 2010, this time by democratic means, and was re-elected in 2015: BBC, ‘Suriname 
country profile’ (BBC, 25 January 2017) < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19997673>. 
133 Moiwana Community (n131), para 34 (e). 
134 Ibid, para 43. 
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On the merits, the State argued inter alia that when the investigation commenced in 
1989 democracy was still not stable and, ‘the climate was not suitable to carry out a sufficient 
investigation.’135 However, it went on, the investigation had resumed in 2002.136 The IACtHR 
responded firmly, holding in relation to Articles 8 and 25 ACHR that, ‘Upon its accession to 
the American Convention in 1987, then, the first legal remedy Suriname was obligated to 
provide was a swift and exhaustive judicial investigation into the events of November 29, 
1986.’ 137  In examining the defective and protracted investigation into those events, the 
IACtHR acknowledged that, ‘victims of rights violations and their family members have a 
right to know the truth regarding those violations.’ 138  Thus the right to truth effectively 
underpinned a duty to investigate the misdeeds of a prior regime, even before the crucial date. 
This is an important legal development indeed. The IACtHR also reiterated that a long-
standing absence of effective remedies is a source of suffering and anguish for victims and 
their family members,139 and found a violation of Article 5 ACHR in that regard (amongst 
other reasons).140  
 
In summary the IACtHR has upheld the right to truth both by its findings on the right 
to humane treatment under Article 5 ACHR and the right to a remedy under one or both of 
Articles 8 and 25 ACHR (taken together with Article 1). State acts or omissions after the 
crucial date may be ‘independent facts’ in respect of which the next of kin is able to vindicate 
procedural rights connected to the right to truth even where the triggering event is both 
instantaneous and prior to the crucial date. This has allowed the IACtHR to impose significant 
obligations upon transitional states emerging from periods of dictatorship.  
 
V. THE RIGHT TO TRUTH AT THE ECtHR 
 
A. General Approach to the Right to Truth 
 
The right to truth has been comparatively slow to develop in the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).141  However we shall see that both dimensions of 
the right to truth that have been visible in the jurisprudence of the HRC and IACtHR are 
emerging in the jurisprudence on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
The ECtHR has been influenced by the HRC View in Quinteros, and has thus 
recognised that in certain circumstances the next of kin of a victim of human rights abuses 
may, themselves, become a victim of inhuman and degrading treatment.142 This approach is 
similar also to that of the IACtHR, as seen in Bámaca Velásquez. Thus on the face of it there 
is formally and functionally comparable jurisprudence on inhuman treatment across all three 
human rights regimes examined so far. However the threshold for violating next of kin rights 
is comparatively high at the ECtHR. In the 1991 Çakici v Turkey judgment the ECtHR 
declined to find a violation of Article 3 in respect of the brother of a disappeared person, 
noting that he had not witnessed the abduction; he had not ‘born the brunt’ of the work 
                                                 
135 Ibid, para 138 (e). Such claims by transitional states for special treatment in human rights law have been 
termed as claims for ‘transitional relativism’: see Sweeney (n33), 3.  
136 Moiwana Community (n131), para 138 (f). 
137 Ibid, para 146. 
138 Ibid, para 147. 
139 Ibid, para 94. 
140 Ibid, para 103. 
141 Sweeney (n33), 72.  
142 Kurt v Turkey (n64), para 130 et seq. 
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attempting to secure justice for his brother; and there were no ‘aggravating factors’.143 In its 
2001 judgment in the Cyprus v Turkey inter-state case the ECtHR further stated that, 
the question whether a family member of a ‘disappeared person’ is a victim of 
treatment contrary to Article 3 will depend on the existence of special factors which 
give the suffering of the person concerned a dimension and character distinct from the 
emotional distress which may be regarded as inevitably caused to relatives of a victim 
of a serious human-rights violation …144  
 
This approach, normalising the ‘inevitable distress’ caused by human rights violations, 
fails to capitalise fully upon the notion that denial of access to the truth viewed through the 
prism of the next of kin’s right to freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment can buttress 
investigative obligations derived from other rights (such as the right to a remedy). Moreover 
the ECtHR has developed the rather unfortunate principle that, 
[W]hile a family member of a ‘disappeared person’ can claim to be a victim of 
treatment contrary to Article 3 …, the same principle would not usually apply to 
situations where the person taken into custody has later been found dead … In such 
cases the Court would normally limit its findings to Article 2.145 
 
In the admissibility decision in Gürtekin and others v Cyprus, the ECtHR confirmed 
that it would make a separate finding on Article 3 ECHR in respect of confirmed deaths only 
in ‘very restricted circumstances.’146 Such circumstances might be where the next of kin were 
direct witnesses to the killing. 147  The ECtHR therefore draws a clear line between a 
‘disappearance case’ and a ‘confirmed death case’, in a way that is not at all reflective of 
developments at the IACtHR and HRC. This is surely an invidious position for the ECtHR to 
adopt.148 
 
We now turn to the second dimension of the right to truth: the duty to investigate and 
prosecute which, at the HRC and IACtHR, was rooted in the right to a remedy.  For the 
ECtHR the obligation to investigate human rights abuses is generally derived from the 
procedural ‘limb’ or ‘aspect’ of the applicable substantive right (i.e. the right to life (Article 2 
ECHR), or freedom from torture (Article 3 ECHR)) rather than the right to a fair hearing 
(Article 6 ECHR) or the right to an effective remedy (Article 13 ECHR). Articles 6 and 13 
ECHR have been used more in respect of checking the remedial phase of domestic human 
rights litigation, with the ECtHR having established that wherever there is an ‘arguable’ 
grievance regarding a Convention right, there must be an effective domestic remedy allowing 
a ‘competent national authority’ to deal both with the substance of the complaint and to grant 
appropriate relief.149 Where a case has been examined from the perspective of Article 6, or 
where there has been substantial discussion of the adequacy of domestic remedies for 
                                                 
143 Çakici v Turkey (App No 23657/94) (2001) 31 EHRR 5, para 99. 
144 Cyprus v Turkey (App No 25781/94) (2002) 35 EHRR, para 156 (emphasis added).  
145 Tanli v Turkey (App No 26129/95) (2002) 35 EHRR 30, para 159; Jelić v Croatia (App No 57856/11) (2015) 
61 EHRR 43, para 111. 
146 Gürtekin and others v Cyprus (dec.) (App Nos 60441/13, 68206/13 and 68667/13) ECHR 11 March 2014, 
para 34. 
147 Shovgurov v Russia (dec.) (App No 17601/12) ECHR 25 August 2015, para 75. 
148 Of course the other systems have looked into the nature of familial relationships in relation to claimed 
inhuman treatment of the next of kin. The IACtHR for example has drawn a distinction between those close 
family members who can be ‘presumed’ to have suffered harm to their mental and moral integrity, and other next 
of kin in relation to which it must evaluate whether particularly close ties existed.  However this jurisprudence 
applies equally to disappearances and ‘confirmed killings’: See Barrios Family (n108), para 302. 
149 See e.g. Aksoy v Turkey (App No 21987/93) (1997) 23 EHRR 553, para 95. 
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admissibility purposes, the ECtHR tends to conclude it is unnecessary to examine the case 
from the perspective of Article 13.150 Nevertheless, when it has examined the Article 13 right 
to a remedy it has held that it is wider than a Contracting State's obligation under Article 2 to 
conduct an effective investigation.151  
 
Recent cases on the reprehensible practice of ‘extraordinary rendition’ have 
exemplified the practice of imposing investigatory duties through the relevant substantive 
right rather than the right to a remedy; whilst at the same time recognising the close 
relationship between duties to investigate and the right to truth. The case of El-Masri v 
Macedonia was brought by a victim of extraordinary rendition. In its discussion of Article 3 
ECHR the ECtHR Grand Chamber declared that it would set out to, 
address another aspect of the inadequate character of the investigation in the present 
case, namely its impact on the right to the truth regarding the relevant circumstances 
of the case. In this connection it underlines the great importance of the present case 
not only for the applicant and his family, but also for other victims of similar crimes 
and the general public, who had the right to know what had happened.152  
 
The Grand Chamber stressed that an adequate investigation of the circumstances was 
essential in maintaining public confidence in the authorities; and that the inadequate 
investigation in his case had prevented El-Masri ‘from being informed what had happened’.153 
Thus whilst the right to truth is ‘subsumed’ within the right to a remedy (implying a duty to 
investigate) in Articles 8 and 25 ACHR, here it is addressed through the procedural limb of 
Article 3 ECHR. Nevertheless the essence of the reasoning is functionally comparable (but 
note that this invocation of Article 3 ECHR is distinct from its other role, where the next of 
kin’s anguish in respect of human rights abuses may give rise to a separate violation of Article 
3).154 
 
It is also important to observe that in El-Masri the applicant sought to rely upon his 
Article 10 ECHR right to ‘receive and impart’ information as the foundation for ‘a right to be 
informed of the truth’ regarding the circumstances that had led to the violations of his 
Convention rights.155 The ECtHR declared this aspect of the complaint manifestly ill-founded, 
as it overlapped with and had been addressed by the application of Article 3 ECHR.156 This is 
directly comparable to the way in which the right to truth is ‘subsumed’ within Articles 8 and 
25 ACHR by the ACtHR, but has been rejected as a free-standing right.  
 
There is thus a clear recognition by the ECtHR that the right to truth is subsumed 
within the procedural limb of certain Convention rights, but that attempts to invoke it 
                                                 
150 See Akdivar and Others v Turkey (App No 21893/93) (1997) 23 EHRR143, para 97; But see the concern 
expressed previously about this very approach in the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Pinheiro and De Meyer in 
W v UK (App No 9749/82) (1988) 10 EHRR 29. See also A Lee, ‘Focus on Article 13 ECHR’ (2015) 20 Judicial 
Review 33, 39.  
151 Kaya v Turkey, (App No 22729/93) (1999) 28 EHRR 1, para 107; Orhan v Turkey App No 25656/94 ECHR 
18 June 2002, ECHR 2002, para 384. 
152 El-Masri (n98), para 191 (emphasis added). 
153 Ibid, para 192. 
154 See Kurt v Turkey (n66), para 133-134, noted above. 
155 El-Masri (n98), para 263. 
156 El-Masri (n98), para 264-5. The same approach was taken in the case of Al Nashiri v Poland (App No 
28761/11) (2015) 60 EHRR 16, even though the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while counteracting terrorism, who had been invited to 
address a public hearing in the case, argued that the right to truth also implicated Article 10 ECHR. See Al 
Nashiri, para 483. 
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expressly will fail. However, in El-Masri there were lengthy separate opinions expressing 
divergent approaches to the right to truth. The Joint Concurring Opinion of judges Tulkens, 
Spielmann, Sicilianos and Keller in El-Masri called for a bolder application of Article 13 
ECHR and criticised, ‘the judgment’s somewhat timid allusion to the right to the truth in the 
context of Article 3’.  
 
Recall that whilst still a member of the ICCPR HRC, ECtHR judge Keller had joined 
HRC member Salvioli in a dissent from the outcome of the Cifuentes inadmissibility decision, 
criticising the majority’s failure to uphold the right to truth. The Joint Concurring Opinion in 
El-Masri is a similar attempt to link the right to truth to the right to a remedy. However it 
should also be noted that in El-Masri the Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Casadevall and 
López Guerra took exactly the opposite approach, and went so far as to describe the 
judgment’s (‘timid’) discussion of the right to truth as ‘redundant’. 
 
Before examining the European approach to cases presenting challenges in terms of 
admissibility ratione temporis, it is necessary to identify the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on 
historical human rights violations that are nevertheless within its temporal jurisdiction. For 
example in the 2007 judgment in Brecknell v UK, the Court examined the effectiveness of a 
1999 investigation into three 1975 murders in Northern Ireland.157 The UK ratified the ECHR 
in 1951 and accepted the right of individual petition in 1966.158 Although the ECtHR found 
for the applicant it reasoned that,  
the nature and extent of any subsequent investigation required by the procedural 
obligation would inevitably depend on the circumstances of each particular case and 
might well differ from that to be expected immediately after a suspicious or violent 
death has occurred. 
 
The Court would also comment that there is little ground to be overly prescriptive as 
regards the possibility of an obligation to investigate unlawful killings arising many 
years after the events since the public interest in obtaining the prosecution and 
conviction of perpetrators is firmly recognised, particularly in the context of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.159 
 
The differing procedural obligation for historical human right violations has been 
observed also in respect of inadequate relaunched investigations into killings in Turkey,160 as 
well as killings and disappearances in Chechnya (Russia).161 The ECtHR has also observed 
that the extent of the duty to investigate may depend on the context, and therefore in the case 
of Al-Skeini v the United Kingdom, observed that,  
in circumstances of generalised violence, armed conflict or insurgency, obstacles may 
be placed in the way of investigators and … concrete constraints may compel the use 
of less effective measures of investigation or may cause an investigation to be 
delayed.162  
 
                                                 
157 Brecknell v UK (App No 32457/04) (2008) 46 EHRR 42, para 66. 
158 Council of Europe, ‘Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 005’ (Council of Europe, 28 June 2017) 
<http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-
/conventions/treaty/005/signatures?p_auth=K81dNial>. 
159 Brecknell (n157), para 68-69 (emphasis added). 
160 See e.g. Gasyak v Turkey (App No 27872/03) ECHR 13 October 2009, amongst many others. 
161 See e.g. Amuyeva v Russia (App No 17321/06) ECHR 25 November 2010, likewise amongst many others. 
162 Al-Skeini v the United Kingdom, (App No 55721/07) (2011) 53 EHRR 18, para 164. 
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The investigative duty is clear, but it is one of means not ends.163   
 
 Finally in this section the recent practice of the ECtHR in respect of Article 46 ECHR 
should be noted. Article 46, as interpreted in the light of Article 1, has been held to impose 
upon respondent states a legal obligation to implement (under the supervision of the Council 
of Europe’s Committee of Ministers), appropriate general or individual measures to secure 
any rights that the ECtHR has found to be violated in a given case.164 Unlike the IACtHR 
acting under Article 63(1) ACHR the ECtHR has not expressly linked its remedial findings to 
vindication of the right to truth, but it has for example given advice about urgent steps to be 
taken to address the issue of the systemic failure to investigate disappearances in the Northern 
Caucasus, including to establish a single, sufficiently high-level body in charge of solving 
disappearances in the region in addition to pursuing an effective criminal investigation.165 
 
B. Admissibility ratione temporis and Transitional Jurisprudence 
 
In the previous section we saw that the European system draws a sharp distinction between 
disappearances (giving rise to continuing violations) and killings (and other instantaneous 
acts). This distinction becomes even more important in relation to the ECtHR’s transitional 
jurisprudence on the right to truth, and so they will be examined separately. 
 
1. Historical Disappearances 
 
In common with the IACtHR, the ECtHR has characterised disappearances as giving rise to a 
continuing situation 166 in respect of which procedural obligations to investigate will persist as 
long as the fate of the missing person is unknown, and even where death may be presumed.167 
On this basis the ECtHR has established temporal jurisdiction in relation to disappearances 
resulting from the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, even though Turkey only accepted the 
right of individual petition in 1987.168 Thus in the 2009 judgment in Varnava v Turkey the 
failure of the Turkish authorities to conduct an effective investigation into the fate of people 
who disappeared in life-threatening circumstances in 1974 disclosed a continuing violation of 
Article 2 ECHR.169 The ECtHR made this finding even though it acknowledged it may be the 
case that, ‘both sides in [the] conflict prefer not to attempt to bring out [events within the 
conflict] to the light of day,’ and may prefer a more ‘politically sensitive’ approach.170 In the 
Varnava judgment the ECtHR also found inter alia a violation of the next of kin’s Article 3 
rights arising from the length of time over which they had been denied an investigation, and 
                                                 
163 Breckell (n157), para 66; Al-Skeini (n162), para 166. 
164 See e.g. Aslakhanova and Others v Russia, (App Nos 2944/06 and 8300/07, 50184/07, 332/08, 42509/10) 
ECHR 18 December 2012, para 210. 
165 Ibid, para 225. 
166 Varnava v Turkey (App No 16064/90) (2010) 50 EHRR 21, para 148; The ECtHR had already observed that 
disappearances have a continuing dimension in the judgment in the inter-state case of Cyprus v Turkey (n144): 
see para 136.  On continuing violations at the ECtHR see generally, A Van Pachtenbeke & and Y Haeck, ‘From 
De Becker to Varnava: the state of continuing situations in the Strasbourg case law’ (2010) EHRLR 47. 
167 Varnava (n166), para 148. 
168 Ibid, para 150. In its 1996 judgment in Loizidou v Turkey (App No 15318/89) (1997) 23 EHRR 513 the 
ECtHR had already established Turkey could be held responsible for human rights violations in northern Cyprus, 
and that the Court would have temporal jurisdiction over other types of violation continuing after the critical date 
for Turkey.  
169 Varnava (n166), para 194. 
170 Ibid, para 193. 
Accepted for publication in International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2018) 
(c) James A Sweeney 2017 
from ‘official indifference in face of their acute anxiety to know the fate of their close family 
members [sic].’171   
 
Thus, in relation to historical disappearances there has been European jurisprudence that is 
functionally equivalent to that seen at the HRC and IACtHR, which in those jurisdictions was 
underpinned by the right to truth (expressly in relation to the right to a remedy at the IACtHR, 
and freedom from inhuman treatment at the HRC). The European jurisprudence developed in 
relation to the 1974 events in Cyprus, but has since been applied inter alia to disappearances 
commencing in the violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, well before the 
Balkan states signed and ratified the ECHR.172  
 
2. Historical confirmed deaths and next of kin rights to humane treatment 
 
Whilst the European jurisprudence on next of kin rights in relation to historical 
disappearances is similar to that of the HRC and IACtHR the situation in respect of historical 
‘confirmed deaths’ is very different, thereby preventing findings such as those in the Sankara 
View and Moiwana Community judgment of the HRC and IACtHR, respectively.173  
 
The dominant European approach is clearly visible in the contrast between the ECtHR 
Chamber and Grand Chamber judgments in the case of Janowiec v Russia. The case 
concerned the secret Soviet execution of nearly 22,000 Polish prisoners of war in 1940, in 
(amongst other places) the Katyn Forest.174 The case, which we shall return to below, was 
brought by family members of those who were killed; who complained inter alia that their 
treatment by the Russian authorities after it signed and ratified the ECHR in 1998 amounted 
to inhuman and degrading treatment. Citing the Sankara HRC View175 the Chamber found a 
violation of Article 3 ECHR,176 observing that compliance with Article 3 in cases such as this 
entailed that states must, ‘exhibit a compassionate and respectful approach’177 - whereas the 
Russian authorities had, ‘demonstrated a flagrant, continuous and callous disregard for [the 
applicants’] concerns and anxieties’.178 However, the Grand Chamber found that by the time 
Russia had ratified the ECHR there was no uncertainty as to the fate of the prisoners and that, 
‘what could initially have been a “disappearance” case must be considered to be a “confirmed 
death” case.’179 Having made this dubious finding, the Grand Chamber then declined to find a 
violation of Article 3 ECHR. The Grand Chamber noted the applicants’ ‘profound grief and 
distress’ but found that it did not reach, ‘a dimension and character distinct from the 
emotional distress which may be regarded as inevitably caused to relatives of victims of a 
serious human rights violation.’180   
 
                                                 
171 Ibid, para 202. 
172 Skendžić and Krznarić v Croatia (App no 16212/08) ECHR 20 January 2011. Compare Skendžić and Krznarić 
with Palić v Bosnia and Herzegovina (App no 4704/04) ECHR 15 February 2011, where the ECtHR gained 
temporal jurisdiction, but declined to find a violation of the procedural limb of Art 2. 
173 Sankara (n74); Moiwana Community (n131).  
174 Janowiec v Russia (Chamber) (App nos 55508/07 and 29520/09) ECHR 16 April 2012, para 16; Janowiec v 
Russia (GC) (n98), para 19.    
175 See in particular Janowiec v Russia (Chamber) (n174), para 163.  
176 Janowiec (Chamber) (n174), para 167. 
177 Ibid, para 163. 
178 Ibid, para 166. 
179 Janowiec (GC) (n98), para 187. 
180 Ibid, para 188. 
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3. Historical Confirmed Deaths and Next of Kin Procedural Rights: the ECtHR ‘Genuine 
Connection’ Test Emerges 
 
In Sankara and Moiwana Community the HRC and IACtHR both also examined the next of 
kin’s right to a remedy. As noted above, the ECtHR’s approach to the Article 13 ECHR 
express right to a remedy is to see it as an adjunct to violations of other rights, rather than the 
source of extensive procedural obligations. Whilst the IACtHR and HRC have been able to 
(more or less explicitly) vindicate the right to truth in respect of historical killings through 
contemporary duties to investigate and prosecute emanating from an express right to a 
remedy, such an option is thus not open to the ECtHR. Instead, in respect of confirmed deaths 
(and accusations of historical torture), it has examined the temporal scope of the procedural 
obligations arising from the right to life (or right to freedom from torture) itself. Here its 
approach is unique, and is at least potentially hugely significant for the vindication of the right 
to truth in transitional human rights jurisprudence. 
 
The ECtHR, in common with the HRC and IACtHR, has accepted that it has no 
temporal jurisdiction over state responsibility for a life allegedly taken or lost 
‘instantaneously’ before the crucial date. This element of the European jurisprudence runs in 
parallel with its approach to instantaneous acts of property confiscation before the crucial 
date. 181 However the ECtHR has since observed that the property jurisprudence on temporal 
admissibility is ‘of a general character’ and that the ‘special nature’ of certain rights, 
including Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, should be taken into consideration.182 After a period in 
which, by its own admission, 183  different Chambers of the ECtHR had taken varying 
approaches to the temporal scope of the procedural dimension of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, in 
the case of Šilih v Slovenia the Court set out to provide some clarity. The Šilih case was not so 
much about the right to truth within the legacy of a totalitarian regime, but the implications 
for transitional jurisprudence became clear soon afterwards.  
 
The Šilih case concerned the death in hospital of the applicants’ son in May 1993, 
after he had sought medical assistance for nausea and itching skin. Slovenia only ratified the 
ECHR in June 1994 – over a year after the death. However, the applicants had initiated 
several allegedly defective civil and criminal proceedings after the crucial date. Slovenia 
argued that the acts or omissions by which a Convention right was allegedly infringed and the 
proceedings related to them were indivisible and so could not be examined separately.184 The 
ECtHR, however, found that the procedural obligation under Article 2 ECHR to carry out an 
effective investigation had evolved into a separate and ‘autonomous’ duty, 185  capable of 
binding Slovenia even though the death occurred before the crucial date. 186  This is 
functionally comparable to the IACtHR’s use of Articles 8 and 25 ACHR, in which we have 
seen that the right to truth may be ‘subsumed’. However, the ECtHR went on, the detachable 
                                                 
181 Bleĉić v Croatia (App no 59532/00) (2006) 43 EHRR 48, para 86. On the ECHR’s transitional property 
jurisprudence see A Buyse, Post-Conflict Housing Restitution: The European human rights perspective with a 
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of the so-called ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.’  
182 Šilih v Slovenia (n17), para 147. 
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procedural obligation in respect of deaths before the crucial date was ‘not open-ended’.187 At 
this point in the judgment, the Grand Chamber set out conditions that would need to be met. 
These conditions add a degree of complexity that is absent from the Inter-American and HRC 
jurisprudence but, at least in theory, presented a distinctive and powerful route to vindication 
of the right to truth in transitional human rights jurisprudence. 
 
First, only procedural acts or omissions that took place after ratification could fall 
within the temporal jurisdiction of the Court.188 Second, there would have to be a ‘genuine 
connection’ between the death and the entry into force of the Convention, in the sense that ‘a 
significant proportion’ of the procedural steps required by Article 2 ‘will have been or ought 
to have been carried out after the critical date’.189 There was, however, to be a further means 
of establishing the ‘genuine connection’, with the Grand Chamber stating that, 
in certain circumstances the connection could also be based on the need to ensure that 
the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention are protected in a real and 
effective manner.190   
 
The Court noted that all the unsuccessful criminal and civil proceedings in this case had 
been initiated after June 1994, and that therefore there was a ‘genuine connection’. 191 A 
violation of Article 2 in its procedural dimension was established. The ECtHR has since 
clarified that the Šilih route to temporal admissibility is available also in respect of 
‘instantaneous’ acts of torture prior to the crucial date.192   
 
4. The ECtHR ‘Genuine Connection’ Test and Transitional Jurisprudence 
 
In a series of cases brought against Romania the ECtHR applied the Šilih approach to 
temporal admissibility to gain jurisdiction over flaws in a contemporary investigation into 
killings carried out during and soon after the fall of the communist Ceaușescu regime, in 
1989.193 This was despite that the ECHR only entered into force for Romania in June 1994. In 
examining the procedural aspect of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR in relation to the events in 
Romania, the ECtHR has observed, ‘the right of the numerous victims to know what had 
happened’,194 and acknowledged ‘the right of victims and their families and heirs to know the 
truth about the circumstances surrounding events involving a massive violation of rights.’195 
                                                 
187 Ibid, para 161. 
188 Ibid, para 162. 
189 Ibid, para 163. 
190 Ibid (emphasis added). 
191 It is fair to say that not all of the judges were particularly happy with the new test: see in particular the 
Concurring opinion of Judge Lorenzen; the Concurring opinion of Judge Zagrebelsky joined by Judges Rozakis, 
Cabral Barreto, Spielmann and Sajó; and the Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Bratza and Türmen. 
192 See Tuna v Turkey (App no. 22339/03) ECHR 19 January 2010, para 58 et seq; Stanimirović v Serbia, (App 
no 26088/06) ECHR 18 October 2011, para 28. 
193 Including Agache and Others v Romania (App no 2712/02) ECHR 20 October 2009; Şandru and Others 
v Romania (App no 22465/03) ECHR 8 December 2009; Association ‘21 December 1989’ and Others 
v Romania (App nos 33810/07 and 18817/08) ECHR 24 May 2011); Catalina Filip v Romania (App no 
15052/09) ECHR 21 April 2015; Melnichuk and Others v Romania, (App nos 35279/10 and 34782/10) ECHR 5 
May 2015. 
194 Association 21 December 1989 (n193), para 142; Mocanu v Romania (Chamber) (App nos 10865/09, 
45886/07 and 32431/08) ECHR 13 November 2012, para 230.  The Mocanu case was later referred to a Grand 
Chamber, which upheld and indeed expanded the findings of the Chamber but did not refer to the ‘knowing the 
truth’ in the same way: Mocanu v Romania (Grand Chamber) (App nos 10865/09, 45886/07 and 32431/08) 
ECHR 17 September 2014. 
195 Association 21 December 1989 (n193), para 144. 
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In this way the ECtHR came close to vindicating the right to truth expressly, having gained 
temporal jurisdiction via the ‘genuine connection’ test.196  
 
The ECtHR has also established temporal jurisdiction in respect of the investigation of 
totalitarian crimes longer ago. In the 2013 Chamber judgment in Przemyk v Poland the 
triggering event was the killing of the applicant’s son by the police in 1983,197 despite Poland 
only recognizing the right of individual petition in 1993.198 The ECtHR noted that the lack of 
rigor in the criminal justice system was, ‘insufficient for coming to terms with the legacy of 
the totalitarian past’.199 Thus whilst the judgment did not expressly mention the right to truth, 
it is clear that the obligations arising from the procedural limb of the right to life can play a 
significant role in historical accounting in respect of transitions from totalitarianism. 
 
The Romanian cases and Przemyk raise the question of exactly how far back in time 
the triggering event can be when it comes to gaining temporal jurisdiction over the procedural 
aspect of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. On the face of it, the ‘genuine connection’ and ‘underlying 
values’ tests could be a powerful tool within the ECtHR’s transitional jurisprudence for 
encouraging new democracies’ effective investigation of their totalitarian past, in such a way 
as to promote the right to truth and historical accounting more broadly. It would seem, 
however, that the ECtHR has declined to seize this opportunity. This is illustrated by the cases 
of Dorado and Dorado Ortiz v Spain, concerning a killing at the start of the Spanish civil war, 
in 1936; and the aforementioned Janowiec Grand Chamber judgment in respect of the 1940 
Katyn massacre.  
 
The admissibility decision in Dorado and Dorado Ortiz v Spain declared the 
application inadmissible on the basis that the complaint was rooted in an event that preceded 
the adoption of the ECHR itself by fourteen years, and its ratification by Spain by some forty-
three years.200 Under these circumstances it was ‘difficult’ to find a ‘genuine connection’ for 
the purposes of the Šilih test.201 Regrettably, the ECtHR did not discuss the ‘underlying 
values’ aspect of the Šilih test.  
 
In the Janowiec v Russia judgment (just two months after Przemyk) the ECtHR Grand 
Chamber set out to clarify the Šilih jurisdictional criteria, and in so doing modified them 
somewhat: it approached the ‘underlying values’ test as an alternative to, rather than a 
                                                 
196 Note that Stanimirović v Serbia (App no 26088/06) ECHR 18 October 201, the ECtHR confirmed that the 
principles established in Šilih similarly applied to the procedural obligation, under Art 3 ECHR, to investigate 
‘instantaneous’ instances of torture before the crucial date. Moreover by doing so the ECtHR abandoned the 
approach taken in earlier cases such as Burkov v Russia 2001 (dec) (App no 46671/99) ECHR 30 January 2001, 
in which by finding a complaint about the health effects of Communist era nuclear nesting in Semey (now in 
Kazakhstan) inadmissible ratione temporis, the possibility of a detachable procedural obligation under Article 3 
upon present-day Russia to investigate under was not considered at all.  
197 Przemyk v Poland (App no 22426/11) ECHR 17 September 2013. 
198 Ibid, para 53. 
199 Ibid, para 74. 
200 Dorado and Dorado Ortiz v Spain (dec) (App no 30141/09) ECHR 27 March 2012, para 36. 
201 Ibid. Note also that the ECtHR also found that, even if the events were characterised as a disappearance, the 
applicants had not displayed due diligence in making their application to, given that the application was only 
introduced in June 2009 although the right of individual petition to the Court had been available in Spain since 
1981. 
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component of, the ‘genuine connection’ test.202 Also, in a slight change of language, the 
‘underlying values’ test was referred to as the ‘Convention values’ test. 203 
 
Examining first whether there was a ‘genuine connection’ and then whether the 
‘Convention values’ test was passed, the Grand Chamber still declined jurisdiction on either 
ground. As to the ‘genuine connection’ between the triggering event and the crucial date the 
Grand Chamber conceded that there were no ‘apparent legal criteria’ for imposing a time limit 
for establishing such a connection, yet then promptly limited it to ten years;204 and found also 
that it was ‘impossible’ to identify real investigative steps or new information after the crucial 
date.205 As to ‘Convention values’, the Grand Chamber stated that they could not be invoked 
in respect of events that occurred prior to the adoption of the ECHR itself.206  
 
This reasoning and conclusion is disappointing on several levels, especially given that 
the Grand Chamber reversed the Chamber’s finding that there had been a violation of Article 
3 ECHR, as noted above. It is an unjustifiably harsh application of the ECtHR’s own earlier 
jurisprudence; and is at odds with the practice of the IACtHR and HRC.  
 
In terms of the harshness of the decision on its own terms, the conclusion that it was 
‘impossible’ to find evidence of investigative steps or new information after the crucial date 
should be seen alongside the Grand Chamber’s own finding that Russia was in breach of its 
Article 38 ECHR obligation to cooperate fully with the ECtHR by supplying all relevant 
documents to it.207 Surely some of the ‘impossibility’ is causally connected to Russia’s failure 
to cooperate. Alternatively, the Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Ziemele, De Gaetano, 
Laffranque and Keller makes a convincing argument that there were identifiable procedural 
shortcomings after the crucial date: their approach being comparable to the HRC’s 
‘affirmation’ doctrine.  
 
The approach to the ‘Convention values’ test is also harsh. First, one might point out 
that the ECHR did not spring out of thin air in 1950, and its ‘values’ may be said to spring 
from what its Preamble describes as a, ‘common heritage of political traditions, ideals, 
freedom and the rule of law.’ This ‘common heritage’ of adherence to the rule of law is, 
surely, an underlying ‘Convention value’ that must have pre-dated the ECHR – and which the 
shooting of prisoners of war clearly violated. Indeed, given the horrific nature of the events, 
the Grand Chamber Partial Dissent of Judge Ziemele et al, quoting directly from the Partly 
Dissenting Chamber Opinion of Judges Spielmann, Villiger and Nuβberger, advocated 
jurisdiction via application of the ‘underlying values’ test (thereby demonstrating that a 
substantial number of judges in total were actually in favour of jurisdiction over an alleged 
Article 2 procedural violation in this case). Second, it is difficult to see why it could not be a 
contemporary ‘Convention value’ that Contracting Parties investigate effectively the most 
notorious events in their totalitarian past (as indeed the applicants themselves had argued).208 
 
                                                 
202 Janowiec (GC) (n98), para 144; for a detailed analysis of this case see C Heri, ‘Enforced Disappearance and 
the European Court of Human Rights’ ratione temporis Jurisdiction: A Discussion of Temporal Elements in 
Janowiec and Others v. Russia’ (2014) 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 751.   
203 Janowiec (GC) (n98), para 144.  
204 Ibid, para 146. 
205 Ibid, para 159. 
206 Ibid, para 151. 
207 Ibid, para 190 et seq. 
208 Ibid, para 117. 
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The main problem from a comparative perspective is with the arbitrary imposition of a 
ten-year limit to the ECtHR’s jurisdiction on the basis of the Šilih ‘genuine connection’ 
criteria. Recall that the triggering event in the Sankara HRC View took place nearly twelve 
years before the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol came into effect for Burkina Faso.209 In the 
IACtHR judgment on Preliminary Objections in Serrano Sisters,210 temporal jurisdiction was 
established over the failure to investigate effectively a triggering event some thirteen years 
before El Salvador accepted the jurisdiction of the IACtHR.211 The ten-year ECtHR limit is 
thus clearly more strict than that seen in other human rights systems. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A COHESIVE APPROACH TO THE ELUSIVE RIGHT 
TO TRUTH 
 
One of the purposes of comparative law is to identify a richer range of solutions to common 
problems.212 If we accept that hiding the truth about human rights abuses of the past is a 
problem, then we are now in a position to identify commonalities and divergences in the way 
that different international human rights bodies have sought a solution. In doing so the right to 
truth may become a little less elusive.  
 
In slightly different but functionally equivalent ways the HRC, IACtHR and ECtHR 
have upheld the substance of an individual right to truth both by recognising that the denial of 
information about human rights violations can rise to the level of inhuman treatment; and also 
through procedural duties to investigate and prosecute. 213  The fact that the ECtHR has 
vindicated the right to truth through the procedural obligations emanating from substantive 
rights, rather than the Article 13 ECHR express right to a remedy is not, at least for this study, 
especially problematic: formal equivalence across the regimes would have the merit of 
simplicity, but it is not inherently superior. It is also important to note that although there has 
been less relevant jurisprudence from the African human rights system, the twin formulation 
of the right to truth observed here is entirely compatible with the findings of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 214  Likewise in the Norbert Zongo case the 
African Court has found that the failure to exercise due diligence in the investigation of a 
journalist’s murder violated the rights of the applicants to have their case heard by competent 
                                                 
209 Sankara (n74).  
210 Serrano Sisters (Preliminary Objections) (n130). 
211 The Serrano Sisters case was about a disappearance, but because of a reservation by El Salvador the IACtHR 
was precluded from examining continuing situations and so the disappearance itself could not give rise to a 
violation of the ACHR. The IACtHR’s examination of the next of kin’s procedural rights is therefore comparable 
to the ECtHR jurisprudence on the duty to investigate instantaneous triggering events rather than on 
disappearances. 
212 Zweigert & Kötz (n22), 15. 
213 See also Groome (n5), but who perhaps underestimated the diversity of approaches between regimes 
identified here. 
214 In Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Another v Sudan (2009) AHRLR 153 the African Commission 
found that the failure to investigate effectively a range of atrocities carried out by the Janjaweed militia 
amounted to a breach of the duty to provide immediate remedies, and violated Articles 4 and 5 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the right to life and the right to humane treatment). Likewise in Amnesty 
International and Others v Sudan (2000) AHRLR 297 the Commission held that holding an individual 
incommunicado, and refusing to inform the family if and where the individual is being held, is inhuman 
treatment of both the detainee and the family concerned. In its 2015 ‘Principles and Guidelines on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights while Countering Terrorism in Africa’, the Commission has also expressly linked Article 9 
ACHPR (right to free expression) to the right to truth, and has stressed that, ‘States shall not withhold 
information regarding gross violations of human rights or serious violations of international humanitarian law, 
including crimes under international law, and systematic or widespread violations of the rights to life, personal 
liberty, and security.’ 
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national courts (as guaranteed by Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights),215 as well as the overarching Article 1 obligation to give effect to the rights in the 
African Charter. It has yet to rule on the next of kin’s rights to freedom from inhuman 
treatment.216   
 
Given that the right to truth in human rights law is not tied to the precise wording of 
particular treaties, it is particularly suited to judicial collaboration or trans-judicial dialogue.217 
It might promote further judicial dialogue to be more explicit about the extent to which the 
right to truth simultaneously underpins both of these types of finding: until now only the 
IACtHR and ECtHR have expressly acknowledged that it underpins the duty to investigate 
and prosecute; whereas only the HRC has regularly invoked the right to truth (or ‘right to 
know’) as a constitutive element of inhuman treatment of the next of kin. Viewed as part of a 
comparative analysis of the right to truth, it bears repeating that the very strict ECtHR test for 
establishing inhuman treatment for the next of kin of victims of human rights violations other 
than disappearances is problematic. 
 
 Even if there continued to be some reluctance consistently to invoke the right to truth 
as a value within findings on the merits, it would align more with the UN’s Updated 
Principles on Impunity218 and Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy219 to 
at least address it systematically within the articulation of remedial duties. We have seen that 
the IACtHR has already taken this step expressly when acting under Article 63(1) ACHR, but 
the ICCPR under Article 2(3) ICCPR and ECtHR under Article 46 ECHR have not.    
 
On the temporal dilemma, which as noted at the outset is particularly significant for 
transitional human rights jurisprudence, there is agreement across regimes (including in the 
African system)220 that disappearances give rise to a continuing obligation to investigate and 
prosecute. There is also agreement in principle that, in relation to other human rights 
violations, sufficiently botched investigative steps after the crucial date can in certain 
circumstances give rise to fresh human rights violations over which the enforcement body has 
temporal jurisdiction. The HRC’s ‘affirmation doctrine’ and the ECtHR’s enquiry into 
procedural acts or omissions after the crucial date (as part of its ‘genuine connection’ test) 
have much in common. Likewise in the Norbert Zongo case the African Court also 
distinguished between instantaneous pre-ratification acts over which it will not have 
jurisdiction, and the contemporary failure to investigate – over which it will.221 It is however 
the IACtHR, in the Moiwana case, that has been the clearest about obligations to investigate 
prior human rights abuses crystallising upon the moment the relevant human rights treaty 
becomes effective for a transitional state, if credible allegations are made. The approach of the 
IACtHR shows how the idea of the right to truth can underpin a bold approach to adjudicating 
                                                 
215 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 
1520 UNTS 217 (African Charter). 
216 But note that the African Commission has found that the incommunicado detention of journalists and political 
dissidents amounts to a violation of the Article 18 ACHPR right to family life of not only the detainees but also 
their family: Article 19 v Eritrea (2007) AHRLR 73, para 103. 
217 See Canivet (n56). 
218 Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat 
impunity (n24). 
219 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy (n25). 
220 Indeed the African Commission has asserted temporal jurisdiction over continuing violations rooted in 
disappearances that occurred well before the African Charter was even adopted: JE Zitha & PJL Zitha v 
Mozambique (Comm no 361/08) ACHPR 23 February to 3 March 2011), (although note that the communication 
in this case was ruled inadmissible on other grounds). 
221 Beneficiaries of Norbert Zongo v Burkina Faso (App no 013/2011) ACtHPR 28 March 2014. 
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on a human rights court’s own temporal jurisdiction, in such a way as to impose a 
contemporary duty to investigate historical human rights violations.  
 
Again though, from a comparative perspective, the approach of the ECtHR to the 
temporal dilemma is stricter than the other human rights enforcement bodies due to the ten-
year limit imposed in the Janowiec case on the establishment of a ‘genuine connection’. This 
would not be quite such an issue if the ECtHR’s ‘underlying’ or ‘Convention values’ 
alternative route to temporal jurisdiction was applied with the effect of gaining jurisdiction to 
at least the same extent as other enforcement bodies. However, thus far no application 
whatsoever has passed this test. This is regrettable because as noted in the introduction there 
seems to be an emerging consensus, in both scholarship and comparative human rights 
jurisprudence, that historical justice plays an important part in the process of transition – 
whether or not it is expressly characterised as vindication of the right to truth. In fact, the 
ECtHR’s ‘underlying values’ test could have led the way in promoting internationally the 
notion that present-day denial or obstruction of the quest for truth about the gravest pre-
ratification human rights abuses may amount, in itself, to a contemporary human rights 
violation. Such an approach does not apply each human rights treaty retroactively, nor does it 
convert every historical human rights abuse into a ‘continuing violation’, but it establishes 
exceptional circumstances in which denying the right to truth about historical human rights 
abuses is constitutive of fresh violation within the temporal jurisdiction of the relevant 
enforcement body. This would support victims’ rights, and the ethos of the Basic Principles 
and Guidelines,222 and would promote the notion that a human rights-respectful state is one 
that takes its history seriously. It is also entirely compatible with the recognition that human 
rights violations amounting to serious international crimes are not subject to statutes of 
liability.223  
 
Importantly though, whilst an ‘underlying values’ test might seem far reaching, it is 
bounded in at least two ways. First, if the duty to investigate also leads to prosecution, then 
any prosecution will have to conform to human rights standards including the right to a fair 
hearing and protection from retroactivity. Second, as the ECtHR (perhaps more so than the 
other bodies) has already recognised, in historical cases and conflict cases (or both), the duty 
to investigate is affected by countervailing factors such as the passage of time and the inherent 
difficulty of investigating under conditions of armed conflict. For example in the Palić 
judgment, which concerned a pre-ratification death and disappearance during the conflict in 
the Former Yugoslavia the ECtHR observed that, 
the obligations under Article 2 must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an 
impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities … The Court takes into 
account the complex situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably in the first ten years 
following the war. In such a post-conflict situation, what amounts to an impossible 
and/or disproportionate burden must be measured by the very particular facts and 
context.224 
 
This might appear to be a form of ‘transitional relativism’, where human rights standards are 
applied relative to the transitional context225 – but it is both pragmatic and proportionate, and 
would prevent an extended jurisdiction to vindicate the right to truth from being limitless.  It 
                                                 
222 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy (n25). 
223 See e.g. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity (adopted 26 November 1968, entered into force 11 November 1970) 754 UNTS 73. 
224 Palić v Bosnia and Herzegovina (App no 4704/04) ECHR 15 February 2011. 
225 Sweeney (n33), 3. 
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does mean that there may be circumstances where a state might be in compliance with its 
human rights obligations even where, due to significant countervailing factors, it has not been 
able to complete its investigations.  However, the approach suggested here promotes the 
expectation of the right to truth being vindicated, and promotes scrutiny of states’ actions in 
this regard.  
 
In the Partly Dissenting Opinion of ECtHR Judge Wojtyczek in the case of Mocanu, 
concern was expressed that the tests established in the Šilih judgment were not clear, and that 
the Janowiec Grand Chamber judgment had done little to clarify them. Judge Wojtyczek, who 
had also dissented in Janowiec, argued that this lack of clarity could lead to ‘excessive hopes’ 
from applicants. The ‘fuzziness of the law’ he continued, ‘may lead to the erosion of the 
legitimacy of the entire system of human-rights protection in Europe.’ On the contrary, it may 
be submitted that dashing the hopes of the victims of the most serious historical human rights 
abuses, and their next of kin, is at least as injurious to the legitimacy and esteem of human 
rights law. Faced with growing hostility to international human rights courts from even fairly 
stable democracies, the greater threat to the protection of human rights is that transitional 
democracies may use such hostility to attempt to legitimise their own rights-restrictive 
practices. Promoting the right to truth in transitional human rights jurisprudence through an 
‘underlying values’ approach can play an important role in preventing backsliding, and may 
preserve, rather than threaten, the protection of human rights.  
